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Hughes: Reciprocity and Economic Concentration Aspects of the ITT Mergers

COMMENTS
RECIPROCITY AND ECONOMIC
CONCENTRATION ASPECTS OF THE ITT
MERGERS-SHOULD THE GOVERNMENT
HAVE SETTLED?
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the last two decades the trend in the United States has
been toward a concentration of economic power in fewer and
larger corporations.' While many factors may have contributed to
this trend, the result is at least partially credited to extensive
merger activity.2 In recent years this merger activity has been
predominantly conglomerate rather than horizontal and vertical.'
Between 1961 and 1969 International Telephone and Telegraph
Company, one of the leading conglomerates, merged with 52 domestic companies and a number of foreign companies. 4 As a result
of its merger activity, in 19691 ITT ranked ninth on Fortune'slist
of the nation's 500 largest industrial corporations.' Among ITT's
1969 acquisitions were Grinnell Corporation, The Hartford Fire
Insurance Company, and Canteen Corporation. The Antitrust
Division of the Justice Department moved to block the mergers
1. See, e.g., Hearingson Economic ConcentrationBefore the Subcomm. on Antitrust
and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 8 (196970) [hereinafter cited as ConcentrationHearings].
2. Id. at 4550-54.
3. FTC Press Release (March 18, 1968); Turner, ConglomerateMergers and Section
7 of the Clayton Act, 78 HARv L. REv. 1313, 1314 (1965). Turner points out that there are
three types of mergers: vertical, horizontal, and conglomerate. A vertical merger is the
acquisitional expansion of a firm toward the control of its raw material suppliers or toward
its product outlets. A horizontal merger is the acquisition of one firm by another producing
the same or similar product line. A conglomerate merger has been defined as any merger
which is neither vertical nor horizontal. Id.
Turner further divides conglomerate mergers into either "pure" or "mixed." In a pure
conglomerate merger there is no discernible economic relationship between the acquiring
and the acquired firms; the mixed conglomerate merger may have horizontal or vertical
characteristics, none of which are so dominant to classify the merger as anything but
conglomerate. Id. at 1315.
4. United States v. ITT, 306 F. Supp. 766, 771 (D. Conn. 1969).
5. The year 1969 was chosen for this data since the mergers with which this paper is
concerned occurred in that year.
6. Fortune, May 1970, p. 184.
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with Grinnell 7 Hartford, 8 and Canteen9 as violative of section 7
of the Clayton Act."0 The three cases-the preliminary injunction
proceeding and the two divestiture proceedings-are significant
from the standpoint of antitrust law because the government lost
all three in the district courts even though the Supreme Court
had found in favor of the government in an earlier case with very
similar facts." The government filed an appeal to the Supreme
Court, but the appeal was later dismissed by agreement of the
parties'2 under Rule 60 of the Supreme Court Rules. 3 The reciprocity and economic concentration issues of these mergers will
be analyzed to determine whether the government should have
settled both from economic and legal points of view.
]1.

RECIPROCITY

One of the government's strongest arguments against the
mergers was that they would increase the probability of ITT's
engaging in reciprocity. Reciprocity is "both the use of purchasing power to obtain sales and the practice of preferring one's
7. United States v. ITT, 324 F. Supp. 19 (D. Conn. 1970) (divestiture); United States
v. ITT, 306 F. Supp. 766 (D. Conn. 1969) (preliminary injunction) [hereinafter cited
without names].
8. 306 F. Supp. 766 (D. Conn. 1969).
9. United States v. ITT, 1971 Trade Cas.
73,619 (N.D. Ill. 1971) (divestiture)
[hereinafter cited without name].
10. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970). The relevant portion of the section states:
[N]o corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the
whole or any part of the stock or other share of capital and no corporation
subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the
whole or any part of the assets of another corporation engaged also in commerce,
where in any line of commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such
acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a
monopoly.
11. FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592 (1965), discussed in text accompanying note 23 infra.
12. On September 24, 1971, ITT entered into three consent decrees to end the litigation against it in the three mergers. See text accompanying notes 122-25 infra.
13. United States v. ITT, 404 U.S. 801 (1971). Sup. CT. R. 60(1) states as follows:
"Whenever the parties thereto shall, by their attorneys of record, file with the clerk an
agreement in writing that an appeal. . . be dismissed. . . the clerk shall, without further
reference to the court, enter an order of dismissal."
14. The government's other contentions were that the mergers increased barriers to
entry and led to vertical integration. Also, in the Grinnell and Hartford cases the government argued that the mergers would eliminate horizontal competition. Only the reciprocity and economic concentration issues will be considered in this article since the other
issues involved only a de minimis economic effect.
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customers in purchasing." 5 "The essence of the arrangement is
the willingness of each company to buy from the other, conditioned upon the expectation that the other company will make
reciprocal purchases."'" Perhaps reciprocity can best be understood by use of an example. X, a manufacturer of large trucks,
purchases tires from Y to be placed on the trucks as they come
off the assembly line. Y uses trucks in the transportation of its
tires. X tells Y that if Y hopes to continue selling tires to X, Y
must purchase all its new trucks from X.
Reciprocity should not be encouraged because it "distorts the
pattern of trade away from the ideal, with no compensating economic advantages."' 7
Whenever considerations of reciprocity enter into the making of purchases or sales, there is a departure from the process
of open competition from which derive many of the benefits of
a free enterprise system. In theory the industrial purchaser seeks
out that supplier who will give him the most satisfactory product at the least cost, partly because lower costs will give him an
enhanced return, but also because his product must be of superior quality to resist the onslaught of his competitors. If industrial producers adopt this attitude in making their purchases, hopefully the consumer benefits by securing a better
product at a lower price."'
If, instead, the industrial purchaser allows the practice of reciprocity to affect his purchasing decisions, the component acquired for his final product may be higher in price or poorer in
quality than if price and quality were the only relevant considerations. 9 The injury may befall the ultimate consumer who has to
pay a higher price or who receives inferior goods. It has been
persuasively contended, however, that this injury is more likely
not to exist since reciprocity more readily occurs in industries in
which products are homogeneous and the prices charged by competing sellers are essentially the same. 0 The real injury is probably borne by the competing sellers who are, in essence, foreclosed
15. Hausman, Reciprocal Dealing and the Antitrust Laws, 77 HARv. L. REv. 873
(1964).
16. Edwards, ConglomerateBigness as a Source of Power, NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONoMic RESEARCH, BusINEsS CONCENTRATION AND PRICE PoLIcY 331, 342 (1955).
17. Turner, supra note 3, at 1387.
18. Hausman, supra note 15, at 879 (citations omitted).
19. Id.
20. Ammer, Realistic Reciprocity, 40 HARV. Bus. REv. 116 (1962).
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from competing for the industrial purchaser's business because
the sellers cannot rely on the traditional method of producing a
component of superior quality and lower price to win the purchaser's favor. Although the purpose of antitrust law is to protect
competition, not competitors, anything which adversely affects a
large number of competitors will eventually have a substantial
adverse effect on competition. The government developed this
latter consideration into an argument against the ITT mergers.
If firm X hopes to encourage its suppliers to buy from X in
return for its continuance of business with those suppliers, X
must be a significant purchaser from its suppliers. Otherwise, the
suppliers could not be coerced into submitting to X's demands.
Thus, anything which increases X's purchasing power also increases the opportunities to engage in reciprocity. Similarly, X
could not coerce its suppliers into purchasing from it unless the
suppliers were also substantial users of X's product. In other
words, X could not force its suppliers to buy a product they do
not use. Anything which increases the suppliers' demand for
products sold by X will also increase reciprocity opportunities.
When X diversifies through a conglomerate merger, X not only
increases its own purchasing power but also increases the likelihood that its suppliers will have a demand for the new products
it trades. For example, firms B, C, and D must purchase sidgets
to make widgets which they sell to firm X. If X produces only
gadgets which are not substitutes for sidgets, X cannot force B,
C, and D to purchase gadgets by threatening to stop purchasing
widgets from them. If Y, which does produce sidgets, is acquired
by X through a conglomerate merger, the possibilities for reciprocity are increased significantly. As Professor Hausman has
indicated: "[d]iversificiation not only increases the number of
opportunities for reciprocal buying; it increases their magnitude."
A single-line producer, even though a near monopolist, may
buy so little of some material that reciprocal buying has little
influence on suppliers as potential customers. But by diversifying. . . a firm may so enlarge its buying as to give it the power
to increase its sales."
21. Hausman, supra note 15, at 876.
22. Stocking & Mueller, Business Reciprocity and the Size of Firms, 30 J. Bus. U.
CH. 73, 77 (1957).
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III.

THE CONSOLIDATED FOODS CASE

The government relied heavily on reciprocity in attempting
to block all three mergers. Support for its position was based on
the leading Supreme Court decision, FTC v. ConsolidatedFoods
Corp.23 Consolidated is a wholesaler and retailer of numerous food
products which it purchases to resell through its retail stores.
Gentry produces dehydrated onion and garlic used by some of
Consolidated's suppliers to make soup. In 1951 Consolidated
acquired Gentry, but in 1963 the FTC ordered divestiture on the
ground that Consolidated could force its suppliers to purchase
their onion and garlic from Gentry. 4 The Commission analogized
reciprocity to tying arrangements which have virtually been declared illegal per se by the Supreme Court.2 A tying arrangement
may be illustrated by the following example. R retail store wants
to purchase bed frames from S supplier. S will sell bed frames to
R only if R will also buy S's mattresses.26 The Commission apparently believed reciprocity so analogous to tying that reciprocity
too should be illegal per se. "[Reciprocity] distorts the focus of
the trader by interposing between him and the traditional competitive factors of price, quality, and service an irrelevant and
alien factor which is destructive of fair and free competition on
21
the basis of merit."
The possibilities for reciprocity undoubtedly existed because
Consolidated, with net sales of over a quarter billion dollars, was
a substantial purchaser from its suppliers, and they in turn purchased about 25% of the onion and garlic in the industry. 8 The
Commis~ion had before it evidence that Consolidated had occasionally tried to force Gentry's onions and garlic onto the food
processors, but there was no evidence of a systematic effort. 2 The
Commission, however, thought Consolidated could succeed in its
efforts because of its massive purchasing power. Thus the Commission found Consolidated's ownership of Gentry was a threat
to competition in violation of section 7 of the Clayton Act.
23. 380 U.S. 592 (1965).
24. 62 F.T.C. 929, 963 (1963), rev'd, 329 F.2d 623 (7th Cir. 1964), rev'd, 380 U.S. 592
(1965).
25. See, e.g., Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
26. See Ferguson, Tying Arrangements and Reciprocity: An Economic Analysis, 30
LAw & ColTEMP. PRoB. 552, 553-58 (1965).
27. 62 F.T.C. at 952.
28. Id. at 957.
29. Id. at 958.
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The Commission's ruling evoked criticism from many commentators" because there appeared to be a legitimate argument
that, even though opportunities for "friendly" reciprocity existed,3" Consolidated simply did not have the leverage to coerce
the food processors to buy from Gentry. If this argument were
true, there could not have been the substantial lessening of competition required to find a merger illegal under the Clayton Act.
Thus on appeal to the Seventh Circuit,3 2 Consolidated argued it
could not afford to reject national brand goods if its suppliers
refused to purchase from Gentry since those goods had received
wide consumer acceptance. Furthermore, the national brand food
processors were well aware of this fact. Therefore, Consolidated
concluded, its power was only illusory, and the national suppliers
knew it would not make purchasing decisions on the basis of
whether the suppliers bought from Gentry. This argument, supported by post-acquisitional evidence that Gentry had actually
lost ground in the garlic market even though its onion market had
increased, persuaded the circuit court to conclude that the Commission had failed to show a probability of a substantial lessening
of competition. 33
The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court, stating "at
the outset that 'reciprocity' made possible by such an acquisition
is one of the congeries of anticompetitive practices at which the
antitrust laws are aimed."3 4 While declaring that the "mere possibility" reciprocity will injure competition is not enough,' 5 the
Court stressed that "Section 7 of the Clayton Act is concerned
'with probabilities, not certainties.'-36 The Court would not say
there was insufficient evidence for the Commission to have found
the probability of a lessening of competition. "Reciprocity was
tried over and again and it sometimes worked. '37 The Court was
not so impressed as was the circuit court with the evidence that
Gentry had lost twelve percent of its garlic market since the
30. See, e.g., Turner, supra note 3, at 1391-93; Ferguson, supra note 26, at 574; Hale
& Hale, Reciprocity Under the AntitrustLaws: A Comment, 113 U. PA. L_ REv.69, 70-74
(1964).
31. If price, quality, and service are equal, there is no reason one firm cannot be
persuaded to buy from another. See Ferguson, supra note 26, at 578.
32. Consolidated Foods Corp. v. FTC, 329 F.2d 623 (7th Cir. 1964).
33. Id. at 626.
34. 380 U.S. at 594.

35. Id. at 598.
36. Id. at 594-95.

37. Id. at 600.
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merger. The Court quoted with approval the Commission's language:
We do not know that its share [of the garlic market] would not
have fallen still farther, had it not been for the influence of
reciprocal buying. This loss of sales fails to refute the likelihood
that Consolidated's reciprocity power, which it has shown a willingness to exploit to the full, will not immunize a substantial
segment of the garlic market from normal quality, price, and
service competition."
It does not appear the Court accepted the Commission's
suggestion that reciprocity should be illegal per se. This interpretation of the Court's opinion has been questioned, however, in
light of an economic analysis of the evidence presented. Professor
Hinnegan found sufficient reason independent of reciprocity to
explain Gentry's new position in the onion market:
[Tihe bulk of evidence is fully consistent with Gentry's increased onion market share for reasons totally divorced from
reciprocity. Gentry was competitive in price, quality, and service, the traditional selling tools in the food industry ....
Gentry developed a new processing method, greatly improving
its product; the industry was expanding rapidly due to the increasing consumer demand for dehydrated foods using onion
and garlic (e.g., dried soups and Italian foods) and processors
desired a second source of supply for their increased requirements. 9

IV. ITT MERGERS
The government claimed the Grinnell, Hartford, and Canteen mergers would give rise to reciprocal dealing by creating a
market structure conducive to reciprocity and reciprocity effect."
The district courts which heard the cases applied a three-step
analysis to determine whether the mergers violated section 7.
First, the merger must significantly increase the opportunities for
38. Id. at 599, quoting from 62 F.T.C. at 960.
39. Hinnegan, Potential Reciprocity and the Conglomerate Merger: Consolidated
Foods Revisited, 17 BUFF. L. REv. 631, 645 (1968).
40. "[R]eciprocity effect refers to the tendency of a company selling or desiring to
sell to another company to channel its purchases to that company." 306 F. Supp. at 781.
See also United States v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 323 F. Supp. 1397 (N.D. Ohio 1971)
in which a district court accepted this theory while enjoining a merger in violation of
section 7.
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reciprocal dealing. Second, there must be a reasonable probability that those opportunities will be exploited. Third, the resulting
reciprocal dealing, if any, must have a tendency substantially to
lessen competition.
A.

ITT-Grinnell4 '

Before acquisition by ITT, Grinnell was the 268th largest
industrial corporation in the United States with annual sales of
approximately 350 million dollars. 2 Grinnell was the largest manufacturer and installer of automatic sprinkler fire protection systems in the country and also a producer of piping for power generating plants and devices from which piping is suspended. 3 The
government claimed all these products were in the relevant lines
of commerce, but the court primarily confined its discussion to
the automatic sprinkler systems. The government contended that
ITT would use its power to exert pressure on its suppliers to
transfer their purchases of spinkler systems to Grinnell." A further contention was that, even if ITT exerted no pressure, its
suppliers would readily transfer their purchases of sprinkler systems to Grinnell in hopes of gaining favor with ITT.4"
As was previously discussed, in order for a merger to increase
significantly the opportunities for reciprocal dealing, two conditions must be present: (1) the acquiring firm (ITT) must be so
significant a customer of its suppliers that they would not risk
losing its patronage and (2) the suppliers must in turn be substantial purchasers of the acquired firm's products (Grinnell's
sprinklers). There was no dispute about the first criterion since
the defendants apparently conceded that ITT was a customer its
suppliers did not desire to lose.4" There was evidence, however,
concerning the second criterion that ITT's suppliers were not
significant purchasers of sprinkler systems. Many of the customers of sprinkler systems are non-industrial-e.g., hospitals, educational insitutions and retail establishments-and most sprin41. 324 F. Supp. 19 (D. Conn. 1970); 306 F. Supp. 766 (D. Conn. 1969).
42. 306 F. Supp. at 771.
43. Id. at 771-72.
44. Id. at 781.
45. Id.
46. 324 F. Supp. at 42. But see United States v. ITT, 1971 Trade Cas.
73,619 (N.D.
Ill. 1971) in which 1IT introduced evidence tending to show itself only a minor purchaser
of the products sold by its suppliers.
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kler work is awarded on the basis of competitive bidding.47 Also,
general contractors purchase the largest portion of sprinkler systems based on bids for construction of new plants and equipment.
The district court thought this last factor minimized the possible
danger of reciprocity since these contractors are not significant
suppliers of ITT.4 Thus the court concluded that no significant
opportunities for reciprocal dealing existed because most of Grinnell's products were purchased by non-suppliers of ITT and,
therefore, ITT had no leverage to force "independent" purchasers
to buy from Grinnell.
The court's reasoning seems slightly flawed since the court
does not consider what may be called "conduit" power.49 ITT may
not have any direct influence over the general contractors who
buy most of the sprinkler systems, but ITT does have power to
influence the purchasers of the new construction who are suppliers of ITT. This may be illustrated by way of a diagram:
General Contractors

Owners of new plants

and equipment

Direction of

purchases

Grinnell competitors

Grinnell

ITT

Uncontroverted evidence showed that in a given year ITT accounted for 28% of total new plant and equipment expenditures
by all United States industries." This fact makes the owners of
new plants and equipment significant suppliers of ITT. Since the
general contractors sell their services almost exclusively to the
owners of new plants and equipment, the general contractors are
significant suppliers of the owners. It is not too difficult to imag47. 324 F. Supp. at 43.
48. Id. at 44.
49. Although the term was not used, the same kind of situation was recognized in
United States v. Ingersoll Rand Co., 320 F.2d 509 (3rd Cir. 1963). See discussion accompanying note 66 infra.
50. 306 F. Supp. at 781.
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ine ITT's applying pressure to the owners who want to remain in
good favor with ITT and in turn the owners' placing pressure on
the general contractors to purchase from Grinnell. This "completed circuit" would have the same effect as ITT's directly influencing the general contractors. The court did not consider this
likely since the general contractors made purchases on the basis
of competitive bids, and it would have been contrary to the ethical standards of the contractors to show favoritism by allowing
one bidder an opportunity to match the lowest bid. 51 The court
may have been correct, but in light of Consolidated Foods it
seems unlikely the Supreme Court would have placed such great
weight on the ethical standards of the general contractors if the
probability of a substantial lessening of competition had otherwise been shown.
B.

52

ITT-Hartford

Prior to merging with ITT, The Hartford Fire Insurance
Company ranked fourth in the United States among companies
writing property and liability insurance through independent
agents and sixth among all property and liability insurance companies. 3 It had total assets of approximately two billion dollars
and annual premium receipts of approximately one billion dollars. Although primarily a property and liability insurance company, Hartford had subsidiaries engaged in writing annuity contracts and surety bonds as well as fire, marine, casualty, life,
accident and health insurance. Within ten years of entering the
life insurance business in 1959, Hartford had in force about 2.5
billion dollars of life insurance.
The primary argument against the ITT-Hartford merger was
also reciprocity. The government claimed ITT would exert pressure on its suppliers to transfer their insurance business to Hartford or else lose ITT as a purchaser. Even in the absence of pressure, the suppliers would tend to switch their insurance business
to Hartford to gain favor with ITT. Again there was no dispute
that ITT was a significant customer of its suppliers, but there was
disagreement about whether ITT's suppliers were significant pur51. 324 F. Supp. at 43-44.
52. 324 F. Supp. 19 (D. Conn. 1970); 306 F. Supp. 766 (D. Conn. 1969).
53. 306 F. Supp. at 772. All remaining information in this paragraph is taken from

the same source.
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chasers of the type of insurance Hartford sold. 4 Not attempting
to reconcile the conflicting evidence, the court turned to other
factors to determine whether the merger created an opportunity
for reciprocal dealing. Among these factors was whether insurance is the type of product which lends itself to reciprocal buying
arrangements. 55 The government introduced evidence showing
that insurance is essentially interchangeable and that large companies often change from one insurance company to another.5 6
The defendant's evidence demonstrated two reasons why it would
be disadvantageous for a company to change insurance carriers.
First, the company might gain a reputation as a carrier-switcher
and, thereafter, find insurers reluctant to insure it and incur large
startup costs without the expectation of a substantial coverage
period. 57 Although such a result might occur if the company made
a habit of switching carriers, it seemed unlikely here in light of
the government's contention that ITT suppliers would switch at
the urging of ITT and that Hartford would be waiting with open
arms. After acquiring insurance with Hartford, the suppliers
would do no more switching to give them a bad reputation.
Second, a surplus may build up on the companies' accounts
during periods when few claims are filed. Such a surplus has a
two-fold effect: (1) it makes the insurer more tolerant during
periods when the accounts are unprofitable and (2) it aids in
obtaining lower premiums when the insurance contract is renegotiated.58 What the defendants did not emphasize is that both of
these effects are conditioned on the existence of a surplus; if the
surplus does not exist, these effects do not apply. As to the second
effect of a surplus, the fact that few claims have been filed against
any insurer would also seem to aid in obtaining lower premiums
when negotiating with a new insurer. The court, nevertheless,
concluded that there is little motive for companies to change
insurers. The argument seems circular, however, because the
court did not consider the factor which the government contended
was the primary motive for the merger-reciprocity. If the opportunity for reciprocity existed, it may have been a sufficient motive to counteract any disadvantage a company encountered by
54. Id. at 787.

55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 788.

58. Id.
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switching insurers. It is not readily apparent, therefore, why the
court believed this factor (i.e., whether insurance lends itself to
reciprocal dealing) to be an independent consideration in determining if the merger created opportunities for reciprocity. The
court, nevertheless, concluded that the merger created no significant new opportunities for reciprocity.
59
C. ITT-Canteen

Prior to its merger with ITT, Canteen Corporation was primarily a seller of vending and manual food service to industrial,
commercial, educational and medical customers.'" It also owned
a division engaged in the vending of cigars and cigarettes and a
subsidiary engaged in a small commercial finance business. Canteen ranked second among companies operating exclusively in the
on-site food service market but ranked only eighth among food
service companies which had widely diversified.
Reciprocity was again the major argument against the
merger, and the government's contention was the same-ITT
would use its power to coerce its suppliers into transferring their
food service business to Canteen and that, even without pressure,
its suppliers would tend to purchase from Canteen to gain favor
with ITT. The defendants were better prepared to argue the merits here than they were in the two preceding mergers. This time
they controverted the government's evidence that ITT was so
significant a customer of its suppliers that its suppliers would not
risk losing its patronage. Even though ITT's annual purchases for
1968 were 840 million dollars, evidence was introduced to show
this amount was an inconsequential percentage of its suppliers'
sales.' Purchases by ITT and Canteen of $20,000 or more from
companies comprising Fortune's list of the 500 largest industrial2
corporations averaged only 0.118% of those suppliers' total sales.1
This evidence is not very persuasive, however, since all ITT suppliers are not large enough to be listed in Fortuneand some of the
smaller ones might depend significantly on purchases by ITT.
This approach is directly analogous to Mr. Justice Stewart's concurring opinion in Consolidatedin which he contended the small
59.
60.
source.
61,
62.

1971 Trade Cas. at 90,530.
Id. at 90,538. All remaining information in this paragraph is taken from the same
Id. at 90,549.
Id.
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suppliers of Consolidated could be coerced into practicing reciprocity even if the national suppliers could not."
ITT's evidence seems weak for still another reason. The figure used by the defendants and by the court was an average which
did not show the percentages of ITT's purchases from individual
suppliers. Thus ITT might have made significant puichases from
several individual suppliers, and this fact could have been disguised by adding to the data many companies with large annual
sales which sold very little or nothing to ITT.
The defendants also argued that ITT's suppliers were not
significant purchasers of the kind of food service in which Canteen was engaged. In their argument they attacked the government's use of statistics that were very similar to those which the
defendants had used in arguing ITT was not a significant customer of its suppliers.64 In addition to evidence about the two
major factors used to determine whether a merger creates a significant opportunity for reciprocity, the court also wanted evidence about the size and diversification of other companies to
which ITT's suppliers sold their products, the degree to which the
markets within which ITT's suppliers operated were competitively structured and the extent to which the food service lent
itself to reciprocal dealing.- The government was unprepared to
present evidence along these lines, and the court concluded the
government had failed to show that ITT had the power to effect
a substantial increase in reciprocal dealing as a result of the
merger.
D. All Three Mergers
Even if one assumes ITT had the power to coerce its suppliers
into engaging in reciprocal dealing, whether ITT would have exploited its power is a different question. Apparently, however,
some courts favor removing the temptation when it exists. Prior
to the Supreme Court's decision in ConsolidatedFoods, the Third
Circuit upheld a district court decision granting a preliminary
injunction in United States v. Ingersoll-Rand Co.66 Ingersoll63. 380 U.S. at 607-08.
64. 1971 Trade Cas. at 90,548.
65. Id. at 90,546. The court believed these factors were important on the basis of two
law review articles: Turner, supra note 3, at 1387-88, and Brodley, Oligopoly Power Under
the Sherman and ClaytonActs-From Economic Theory to Legal Policy, 19 STAN. L. REv.
285, 327 (1967).
66. 320 F.2d 509 (3rd Cir. 1963).
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Rand, a large designer and manufacturer of industrial machinery,
had entered agreements to acquire three leading manufacturers
of underground coal mining machinery. One of the contentions
the government relied upon to defeat the merger was reciprocity.
The government argued that the merger would substantially increase the purchasing power of Ingersoll-Rand, especially in steel.
Since the steel industry is one of the largest markets for coal, the
merger would create an opportunity for reciprocity. IngersollRand could exert the force of its purchasing power through the
steel industry to increase sales of equipment by the newly acquired firms. The potential of this situation, however, troubled
the court more than the probability of actual coercion.
[Tihe mere existence of this purchasing power might make its
conscious employment toward this end unnecessary; the possession of the power is frequently sufficient, as sophisticated businessmen are quick to see the advantages in securing the goodwill
of the possessor. Certainly the steel producer who seeks orders
from Ingersoll-Rand may tend to prefer the acquired companies
as the source of supply of equipment used in his" "captive"
mines, and the advantages accruing to him from so favoring the
acquired companies would not have to be pointed out by
Ingersoll-Rand."
Thus the district court found the mere creation of an opportunity
to enter into reciprocity arrangements resulting from a merger
was sufficient alone to grant a preliminary injunction. In affirming the lower court's holding, the Third Circuit stated:
[We take the view that all the United States is required to
establish at the present stage of this case is the probability of a
lessening of competition and a showing of reasonable probability
of success on final hearing. We agree with the court below in its
conclusion that the United States has met this burden in both
respects."8
After the Consolidated Foods decision, one is tempted to
question the reliability of the Ingersoll-Randposition on reciprocity. However, Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co. v. White Consolidated Industries,Inc.6" gave the Third Circuit an opportunity
to reexamine its prior position in light of Consolidated Foods.
67. 218 F. Supp. at 552, quoted in 320 F.2d at 524 (emphasis added).
68. 320 F.2d at 525.
69. 414 F.2d 506 (3rd Cir. 1969), cert.denied, 396 U.S. 1009 (1970).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol25/iss4/11

14

Hughes: Reciprocity and Economic Concentration Aspects of the ITT Mergers

19731

ITT

MERGERS

Once again the court determined that the opportunity for reciprocal dealing was enough to grant a preliminary injunction. White
Consolidated Industries, a large diversified manufacturer, attempted to acquire Allis-Chalmers, a manufacturer only slightly
smaller than White in terms of annual sales. 0 Allis-Chalmers
sought a preliminary injunction to stop the acquisition, in part
because it would create the opportunity to engage in reciprocity.
The court granted the injunction after noting that both White
and Allis-Chalmers were substantial purchasers from the steel
companies and that the steel companies were substantial purchasers from Blaw-Knox, a White subsidiary. Although the opportunities for reciprocity already existed, the addition of AllisChalmers substantially increased those opportunities. Clearly the
Third Circuit has interpreted ConsolidatedFoods to mean that
any merger creating a market structure conducive to reciprocal
dealing violates section 7.71
In United States v. White ConsolidatedIndustries,Inc.," the
District Court for Northern Ohio granted a preliminary injunction to prevent the merger of White Consolidated and White
Motor Corporation, two large diversified companies. The government contended that the merger would lead not to coercive reciprocity but instead to "reciprocity effect. 7 3 The court accepted
the government's argument and cited Allis-Chalmers to support
its position.
Although this Court is not bound by decisions of the Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit, the logic of its opinion in the
Allis-Chalmers case seems both inescapable and quite compelling. The result of a merger between the defendant corporations
would be no less than a super conglomerate, whose impact upon
the market can hardly be gauged .... [Tiheir mere size in
the market will operate as a lever which in turn will lessen
competition. Unquestionably, other firms will hesitate to compete too zealously with one division out of fear of antagonizing
the entire firm and losing it as a customer for other goods. 4
Other courts have interpreted ConsolidatedFoods to require
70. In 1967 Allis-Chalmers had annual sales of $821,000,000 while in 1968 White's
total sales were $825,000,000. Id. at 511.
71. The court uses language to this effect. Id. at 518.
72. 323 F. Supp. 1397 (N.D. Ohio 1971).
73. See note 40 supra.
74. 323 F. Supp. at 1398-99.
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a probability of reciprocal dealing. Thus in United States v. Penick & Ford, Ltd." and United States v. Northwest Industries,
Inc.," the district courts refused to grant preliminary injunctions
even though they recognized the potential for reciprocity had
been substantially increased. In Penick & Ford the court was also
impressed with a company policy against reciprocity.
In the ITT cases the government argued it need only show
opportunities for reciprocity to defeat the mergers under section
7. In essence, the government had interpreted Consolidated
Foods to prohibit any merger creating a possibility of lessened
competition. This interpretation would have amounted to a per
se rule condemning reciprocity. The result would be the condemnation of all conglomerate mergers since it is difficult to imagine
a conglomerate merger which does not increase the opportunities
for engaging in reciprocity. 7 Such a test seems too rigid to make
economic sense because some mergers may even enchance competition." In his concurring opinion in Consolidated Foods, Mr.
Justice Stewart stated the more economically realistic approach:
"Clearly the opportunity for reciprocity is not alone enough to
invalidate a merger under § 7. The Clayton Act was not passed
to outlaw diversification." 9
The language of section 7 is explicit in its requirement that
the relevant consideration for illegality is whether there is a
probability, and not a possibility, competition will be substantially lessened. In other words, "[iut is the effect of reciprocity,
not the fact of reciprocity, which is pertinent."8" In trying to determine what meaning the Supreme Court in ConsolidatedFoods
gave such words as "probable" and "substantial," Professor Hinnegan has suggested the terms are a matter of degree:
"[P]robable" lies somewhere between "possible" and "certain," and "substantial" between "some" and "all." Thus, the
question is "where along the spectrum do we find the Supreme
75. 242 F. Supp. 518 (D.N.J. 1965).
76. 301 F. Supp. 1066 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
77. Harsha, The Conglomerate Merger and Reciprocity- Condemned by
Conjecture?, 9 ANTrrRUsT BULL. 201, 204 (1964).
78. If ITT had acquired a small company which had been struggling in an industry
among giants, competition may have been increased by the merger.
79, 380 U.S. at 603.
80. Phillips, Reciprocity Under the Antitrust Laws: Observations on the Hales'
Comment, 113 U. PA. L. Ray. 77, 78 (1964) (emphasis added).
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Court?" And the answer, suggested by a reading of the record
in the case, is "Very near the low end.'""L
There are indications that Professor Hinnegan is correct. Mr.
Justice Stewart found it necessary to write a concurring opinion
stating flatly that the opportunity to engage in reciprocity is not
enough to invalidate a merger under section 7 and that the test
is still probability of substantial lessening of competition. 2 Further he stated, "The record in this case is sorely incomplete, and
a reviewing court is given little guidance in determining why this
merger should be voided, if reciprocity-creating mergers are not
per se invalid. 8 3 He went on to find, however, "just enough to
support the invalidation of the merger, but because of evidence
not referred to in the Court's opinion."8 Therefore, it seems the
Court has established a presumption of illegality whenever a
merger creates the possibility of the use of reciprocal buying to
influence a substantial share of the market and the structure of
the market is such that the reciprocity will lessen competition.8 5
It is unnecessary to have market power to engage in reciprocal dealing since even very small entities find the practice attractive.86 For example, X is a gas station operator and Y is the owner
of a local grocery store. X agrees to buy all his groceries from Y if
Y will agree to buy all his gasoline from X. Surely this is reciprocity and there is some foreclosure in the relevant markets of groceries and gasoline. Thus this situation does have an adverse effect
on competition. The question, however, is whether the antitrust
machinery is prepared to police this type of situation, and apparently the answer is "No." The antitrust machinery has more than
enough to do without chasing elusive butterflies when elephants
are on the loose. Thus any anticompetitive practice which creates
a de minimis problem should not be the subject of concern.
81. Hinnegan, supra note 39, at 645.
82. 380 U.S. at 605.
83. Id. at 606.
84. Id. at 607. Although he accepted Consolidated's argument that national brand
processors could not be pressured, Mr. Justice Stewart believed the smaller processors
whose labels had not received wide consumer acceptance could be pressured. Id.
Even if this were true, there is some question whether competition would be
substantially lessened. There was evidence that about 90% of Gentry's sales were to
customers buying over 10,000 pounds of either onions or garlic or both. The national
suppliers naturally made up the vast majority, if not all, of the 90%. Thus only around
10% of Gentry's sales could have been the result of coercive reciprocity.
85. See, e.g., Harsha, supra note 77; 44 TEx. L. REv. 1019, 1022-23 (1966).
86. Ferguson, supra note 26, at 579.
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Although market power is not a prerequisite for reciprocity,
it is a prerequisite for reciprocity to result in an anticompetitive
effect. 7 When there is already an oligopolistic market structure,
there seems to be no reason to tolerate even the slightest foreclosure. Market structure may have been a key factor in the Su8
preme Court's invalidation of the merger in ConsolidatedFoods."
Gentry and one other competitor held about ninety percent of the
dehydrated garlic and onion market. The Court believed Consolidated would use its leverage to strengthen Gentry's position, and
the Court saw no justification for allowing such action. An analogy may be drawn to the acquisitions in the present cases. Although the district court did not find Grinnell dominant in any
market, the court did determine that in Grinnell's relatively oligopolistic product markets its shares ranged from 4% to 44.3%.
Likewise, Hartford and Canteen held significant shares of their
respective product markets. If the market structure of the acquired firm is oligopolistic, it may be presumed competition will
be substantially lessened if there is a probability reciprocity will
occur. This presumption would not drastically distort the economic meaning of section 7. If it could be established, therefore,
that reciprocity would probably result, there seems to be no justification for allowing the acquisitions. It seems, however, the test
must remain whether there is a probability, not possibility, reciprocity will occur.
Evidence was presented in all three cases that ITT would not
have taken advantage of opportunities for reciprocal dealing even
if such opportunities were created by the mergers. First, ITT is
organized into a series of profit centers each having its own decentralized purchasing and sales department. Managers within a
profit center are paid and promoted according to the success and
profit in their profit center rather than according to the performance of ITT as a whole. Arguably, a manager would have no
incentive to engage in reciprocity, which can be very inefficient,
since it would taint the performance of his profit center even if it
aided another. The argument is imperfect, however, since several
managers may collaborate to work out a solution favorable to all.
Further, it is entirely inapplicable where reciprocity is used
87. Id.
88. Brodley, supra note 65, at 325-29.
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merely to capture all the business when the prices are the same
as those of competitors.89
Second, ITT does not collect purchasing and sales data necessary to identify reciprocal purchasing opportunities. It has been
contended for some time that reciprocity presents its greatest
danger when it is practiced on a formalized basis. Unless there
is an effective system of information, coordination, and communication to obtain the evidence of reciprocity necessary to police
it, apparently there is no significant danger to free competition.'
Thus without this purchasing and sales data, there may be little
chance that ITT could engage in systematic reciprocity which
would violate section 7.
ITT also argued that it has had a strong written policy
against reciprocity since 1966 and an unwritten one prior to that
date. Conceivably the desire to place the policy in writing was a
direct result of the Supreme Court's decision in Consolidated
Foods in 1965. The court was impressed with ITT's policy-so
much so that it distinguished two unfavorable cases from the
Third Circuit solely on the basis of this policy.
While Ingersoll-Rand and Allis-Chalmers lend strong support to the theory that a merger which will bring about a market
structure favorable to reciprocal dealing offends Section 7, there
is a crucial factual distinction between these two cases and the
instant case. In Ingersoll-RandandAllis-Chalmers, there was no
evidence of company policy against reciprocal dealing; in the
instant case there is evidence to that effect which
the Court
2
regards as substantial, credible and persuasive.
Despite the weight the court seemingly gave this evidence, it is
doubtful that the mere existence of a written policy would ever
be determinative. In the present cases, however, the policy was
reinforced by the most persuasive evidence-ITT's past record.
The government launched an extensive investigation into ITT's
conduct over the last decade, including its 104 acquisitions during
that time period. When this search was completed, the govern89. As indicated previously, reciprocity generally occurs in industries with homogeneous products and similar prices. See text accompanying note 20 supra.
90. Ammer, supra note 20.
91. Id. It may be questioned, however, whether the lack of data will prevent the
reciprocity from being harmful to competition or will merely affect the degree of harm to
competition.
92. 306 F. Supp. at 785 (emphasis added).
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ment had failed to uncover persuasive evidence that ITT had
either engaged in reciprocal dealing on its own or had benefited
from reciprocity effect on the part of its suppliers. 3 It is difficult
to believe that a corporation the size of ITT has not engaged in
reciprocity over the last decade, but the lack of evidence may
have convinced the courts that the policy against reciprocity was
actually working. Likewise, no evidence of reciprocity effect from
prior mergers was revealed, and the courts believed it improbable
that reciprocity effect would result from the present mergers after
it became apparent to ITT's suppliers that ITT did not intend to
reciprocate.
One major difference between the ITT cases and the
ConsolidatedFoods case is that Consolidated was attacked eleven
years after the merger when there was some evidence of reciprocity. ITT,however, was attacked before any reciprocity could have
occurred. Without post-acquisitional evidence or the showing of
past involvement in reciprocal dealing, it will apparently be extremely difficult for the government to illustrate a probability of
a significant increase in reciprocity. The United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York applied Consolidated
Foods in United States v. General Dynamics Corp. 4 to hold a
conglomerate merger violative of section 7 on the basis of reciprocal dealing. General Dynamics acquired Liquid Carbonic and
immediately began a program of reciprocity. In fact it was proved
by the government that reciprocity was one of the primary motives for the acquisition. As in ConsolidatedFoods there was postacquisitional evidence to which the government could point to
prove that the merger had led to substantial increases in reciprocal dealings. In the ITT cases, however, the mergers were attacked by the government before there was time for a pattern of
reciprocity to develop. Having foregone the possibility of acquiring post-acquisitional evidence and failing to uncover any past
incidences of reciprocity by ITT, the government could not convince the courts that these three mergers were likely to result in
93. The government did present some evidence that ITT had engaged in reciprocity,
but the court was not convinced. See, e.g., Post-Trial Brief for the United States, p. 54:
ITT has also engaged or attempted to engage in reciprocal practices over the
years. Although ITT has issued an "anti-reciprocity policy" directive, this directive appears to be aimed at the prevention of a systematic reciprocity program
throughout all of ITT, but does not forbid the use of reciprocal practices when
convenient and useful to ITT.
94. 258 F. Supp. 36 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
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reciprocity when previous ITT mergers apparently had not. Thus
the courts decided the mergers did not violate section 7.
V.

ECONOMIC CONCENTRATION

The government also contended that the ITT mergers were
part of a trend toward economic concentration of assets in fewer
and larger corporations. This trend, which has an anticompetitive
effect in numerous lines of commerce across the nation, has been
the subject of several congressional hearings in the last few
years.95 Available data indicate that in 1968 the 200 largest corporations controlled a share of assets equal to that held by the 1,000
largest in 1941.96 In late 1969 it was estimated that the top 200
manufacturing corporations controlled about two-thirds of all
assets held by corporations engaged primarily in manufacturing. 7
This trend is even more disturbing when it is recognized
that the level of overall concentration of corporation decisionmaking may, in many instances, be much greater ....
[M]any of the top 200 corporations are partially linked with
each other and with other corporations in ways that may prevent or discourage independent behavior in market decisions.
Two of the most important such ties are corporate joint ventures
and management interlocks. 8
Merger activity has played the most significant role in centralizing this control of industrial assets.9 9 Further, the largest
corporations have been the most active in mergers, and the acquired firms have generally been the leaders in their industries.
The 200 largest manufacturing corporations of 1968 made
over 60 per cent (measured by assets) of all large manufacturing
and mining acquisitions occurring during the 21-year period
1948-68 . . . . Over this period they acquired 3,900 companies
with combined assets in excess of $50 billion ....
During 1961-68, the 25 most active acquiring corporations
made acquisitions totaling $20 billion, or almost 60 per cent of
all acquisitions of the top 200 during the period. .... "I
95. See, e.g., Concentration Hearings, supra note 1; Hearings on the Status and
Futureof Small Business Before the Senate Select Comm. on Small Business, 90th Cong.,
1st Sess., pt.2 (1967).
96. ConcentrationHearings at 4549.
97. Id. at 4550.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 4558.
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The greatest number of these mergers in recent years has been of
the conglomerate nature rather than horizontal and vertical.101
ITT alone accounted for over 100 mergers in the decade of 196070.02

In the preliminary injunction hearing against Grinnell and
Hartford and the later trial on the merits against Grinnell, the
government wanted to introduce testimony by Dr. Willard F.
Mueller, former chief economist of the Federal Trade Commission, that this trend among conglomerates has anticompetitive
consequences in "numerous though undesignated individual
'lines of commerce.' "103 Although the opinions do not elaborate
upon this argument, Dr. Mueller explained it in detail in a con0 Not only do conglomerate acquisitions ingressional hearing.'1
crease the likelihood that the same or related decisionmakers will
have access to competing firms through such means as interlocking directorates, but also the conglomerate's size and diversification create mutual interdependence and forbearance with other
firms:
By increasing both size and diversification, conglomerate
merger increases the number of contact points shared with competitors, suppliers, and customers, thereby increasing the mutual awareness of common interests among firms. Simply put,
growing conglomeration and overall industrial concentration
greatly broaden and extend traditional "communities of interest" among key industrial decisionmakers.0 5
Reciprocal buying is symptomatic, a manifestation of the more
general problem of conglomerate interdependence and forbearance. In many respects conglomerate interdependence and forbearance represents the most serious threat to competition resulting from the growing merger-achieved centralization of economic resources among a relatively few conglomerate enterprises that meet as actual or potential competitors in many
markets. 0 '
It is best to explain this argument with an example used by Dr.
101,
102,
103.
104.
105.
106.

FTC Press Release (March 18, 1968).
1971 Trade Cas, at 90,551.
324 F. Supp. at 52.
ConcentrationHearings at 4566-69.
Id. at 4567.
Id. at 4568.
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Mueller." 7 Consolidated Foods is not only one of the nation's
largest food manufacturers, it was, until recently, one of the largest food retailers. In 1965 Consolidated acquired several retail
stores in Chicago and began promotional price competition.
Among the other retailers in Chicago were several large chains,
including National Tea Company which is also an important customer of Consolidated's manufactured foods. National Tea
threatened to stop carrying Consolidated's products if the price
competition continued and Consolidated, not wanting to lose an
important customer, soon terminated the practice.
Conglomerate interdependence and forbearance has thus
eliminated actual as well as potential competition. Because
Consolidated was a food manufacturer as well as a food retailer,
the competitive strategies it followed in one market threatened
to boomerang by inviting retaliation in another. Had National
Tea not been one of its customers, Consolidated could have
behaved independently of National Tea in expanding its food
retailing operations in Chicago." 8
In the same manner the government claimed the Hartford
and Grinnell mergers would tend to lessen competition in some
lines of commerce perhaps unrelated to the products of those
companies. The court not only refused to accept this argument
but excluded the evidence as being irrelevant since
the legislative history, the statute itself and the controlling decisional law all make it clear beyond a peradventure of a doubt
that in a Section 7 case the alleged anticompetitive effects of a
merger must be examined in the context of specific product and
geographic markets . .

..N

The language of the statute indicates only that an acquisition is
illegal if "in any line of commerce in any section of the country,

the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly." 0 Further, the House"'
and Senate" 2 Reports recommending passage of section 7 do not
107. Id. at 4567-68.
108. Id. at 4568.
109. 324 F. Supp. at 52.
110. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970) (emphasis added).
111. "[Ihe purpose of the bill is to protect competition in each line of commerce
in each section of the country." H.R. REP. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1949) (empha-

sis added).
112. "It is intended that acquisitions which substantially lessen competition, as well
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unequivocally state that particularlines of commerce must be
determined. The court is quite correct, however, in saying that
decisional law has followed a practice of defining a specific line
of commerce to examine the alleged anticompetitive effect of the
merger, "3 but none of the cases yet have involved a pure conglomerate acquisition." 4
Based solely on an analysis of the committee reports and
congressional debates, it is arguable that in passing section 7,
Congress was concerned not only with concentration within a
particular industry but with economic concentration in general.
If so, the determination of whether a particular merger were anticompetitive would not be restricted to an analysis of the impact
11 5
on specific lines of commerce or definite geographic markets.
This position is essentially the same as that of the government
in claiming that anticompetitive effects, although presently unascertainable, will result somewhere along the product lines of the
conglomerate since the mergers increase the "contact points"
shared with competitors, suppliers and customers. The government's test for expanding section 7 would apparently condemn all
large conglomerate mergers involving the acquisition of firms
which already hold leading positions in concentrated industries.
The purported justification is that economic concentration, if allowed to continue in this manner, will eventually have a substantial anticompetitive effect; thus it should be stopped before the
trend becomes irreversible. The problem with this per se rule is
that it would condemn all mergers increasing economic concentration even though some of those mergers might have procompetitive effects." 6 The Supreme Court would probably not
have accepted this rule had the government appealed from the
district courts' decisions. Given the inclination of the Court for
presumptive rules, however, it might have presumed such a
as those which tend to create a monopoly, will be unlawful if they have the specified effect
S. REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1950) (emphasis
in any line of commerce ....
added).
113. See, e.g., United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966); FTC v.
Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592 (1965); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S.
294 (1962).
114. See note 3 supra.
115. Thomas, Conglomerate Merger Syndrome-A Comparison: CongressionalPolicy with Enforcement Policy, 36 FORDHAM L. REv.461, 555-58 (1968).
116. For a discussion, see Note, Conglomerates and Section 7: Is Size Enough?, 70
COLUM. L. REv. 337, 357 (1970).
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merger to be illegal, forcing the parties to rebut the presumption
with a showing of economic justification. Such an "expansion" of
section 7 would give the Justice Department another weapon
against the pure conglomerate without doing violence to the congressional intent. On the other hand, if the Court were not to
expand its interpretation of section 7, congressional action would
be required to meet the problem of the pure conglomerate. It is
unfortunate the Supreme Court never had the opportunity to
accept or reject this expansion of section 7, for it is unlikely new
legislation attacking the problem will be forthcoming unless this
expansion is rejected.
VI.

CONCLUSIONS

Unless there was pertinent evidence presented at the trials
which the opinions did not consider, it appears that the district
courts reached the proper results based on an economic analysis
and the presently acceptable interpretation of section 7. Certainly the potential for reciprocity was significantly increased by
the mergers, and perhaps enough evidence was presented to prove
ITT had the power to force its suppliers to purchase from its new
acquisitions. That alone, however, is insufficient to halt the mergers. To complete its case, the government had to prove a probability reciprocity would result from the mergers. Thus, the most
notable gap in the government's case was its failure to establish
that any form of reciprocal dealing would occur. Whether the
government's inability to illustrate a probable increase in reciprocal dealing was the result of ITT's written policy, profit center
concept, failure to collect purchasing and sales data, or simply
the government's poor research, the district courts were correct
in their conclusions that the mergers should not be "condemned
by conjecture" on the evidence presented. Similarly, the district
courts were correct in rejecting the government's economic concentration argument since the Supreme Court decisions have
emphasized the necessity of defining the relevant product markets to measure the anticompetitive effects of the mergers. If
section 7 does not require this kind of analysis in cases involving
"pure" conglomerates, the Supreme Court should make that decision. If section 7 cannot bear this interpretation, the problem
may be resolved only by congressional action.
Even if the decisions were economically sound, the legal
question remains unanswered: How would the Supreme Court
Published by Scholar Commons, 1973
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have decided the cases had they been appealed? The Court would
probably have condemned the ITT mergers in a decision as questionable from an economic analysis as was ConsolidatedFoods.
Perhaps, however, an in-depth economic analysis diminishes the
effectiveness of section 7 since the government's enforcement resources are so limited and the range of factual inquiry required
is so broad.11 7 Further, even after all the relevant economic facts
and theory have been examined, any judgment concerning the
future effects of a merger must still be partly based on conjecture."1 8 Since this judgment determines the legal validity of a
business decision, perhaps it should not be based on a time consuming, expensive and cumbersome analysis. The Supreme
Court gives credibility to this argument in United States v. Philadelphia NationalBank"' stating:
[U]nless businessmen can assess the legal consequences of a
merger with some confidence, sound business planning is retarded. . . . And so in any case in which it is possible, without
doing violence to the congressional objective embodied in § 7,
to simplify the test of illegality, the courts ought to do so in the
interest of sound and practical judicial administration.'2 ,
It appears from ConsolidatedFoods the Court has done precisely
that-i.e., replaced a broad range of objective proof with a presumptive rule to simplify the law and to lighten its enforcement
tasks.'12 ' Thus any merger is presumed to be in violation of section
7 if it would create a market structure conducive to reciprocity
and if the potential reciprocity would enable the acquired firm to
strengthen or to retain its position in an already oligopolistic
market. Whether this presumption is rebuttable and, if so, how
it could be adequately rebutted are difficult to determine since
ConsolidatedFoods is the only reciprocity-merger case to have
reached the Supreme Court.
ITT also lacked confidence in the district courts' interpretation of ConsolidatedFoods and/or section 7 since, after winning
all three cases, ITT entered into three consent decrees with the
Justice Department to prevent an appeal."' ITT was ordered to
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

44 TEx. L. Ray. 1019, 1023 (1966).
Id.
374 U.S. 321 (1963).
Id. at 362.
Harsha, supra note 77. See also 44 Tax. L. REv. 1019, 1023 (1966).
73,667 (N.D. I1. 1971) (ITT Canteen
United States v. ITT, 1971 Trade Cas.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol25/iss4/11

26

Hughes: Reciprocity and Economic Concentration Aspects of the ITT Mergers
1973]

ITT MERGERS

divest itself of all its interest in the Fire Protection Division of
Grinnell and all the assets of both Hajoca Corporation'23 and
Canteen. 2 ' Further, ITT had to divest itself of the following companies: Levitt and Sons, Inc., Avis, Inc., Hamilton Life Insurance
Company, and ITT Life Insurance Company of New York; or in
the alternative, Hartford.'25 ITT chose to retain Hartford and sell
the others. Also, ITT was enjoined for ten years from participating in any reciprocal relations involving its new acquisitions.
The settlement created much controversy because many people believed the government could have won the cases on appeal
to the Supreme Court.1"6 Therefore, why did the government settle? Normally a settlement is reached when neither party is willing to gamble on the final outcome, but a settlement in the antitrust field is a good substitute for a decision only if the same
purposes are achieved. Were the same purposes achieved in the
present situation? Perhaps the short-run objective was reached
since ITT did have to divest itself of many of the holdings which
the government believed presented problems, but the more important long-run objective was sacrificed. Stated simply, the law
on conglomerate mergers is anything but clear. While commentators have criticized ConsolidatedFoods from an economic analysis, the government has attempted to expand section 7 to reach
the pure conglomerate. Since an out-of-court settlement has no
value as precedent, the present situation called not for a settlement for one company but for an elaboration by the Supreme
Court upon the law affecting all future conglomerate mergers. For
this purpose it is irrelevant whether or not the Supreme Court
would have rejected the district courts' approach. Before businessmen can bring their activities within the boundaries of the
law, those boundaries must be well defined. At least for the present, the consent decrees have eliminated the opportunity for clarifying the law on conglomerate mergers.
One final point should be made. When an area of the law is
Corp.); United States v. ITT, 1971 Trade Cas.
73,666 (D. Conn. 1971) (Hartford Fire);
United States v. IT, 1971 Trade Cas.
73,665 (D. Conn. 1971) (Grinnell).
123. 1971 Trade Cas. at 90,764 (Grinnell).
124. 1971 Trade Cas. at 90,775 (ITT Canteen Corp.).
125. 1971 Trade Cas. at 90,768 (Hartford Fire).
126. In March of 1972 it was disclosed that an ITT subsidiary (Sheraton Inn Corp.)
had made a $400,000 contribution to the Republican Party. Lawrence O'Brien, an exChairman of the Democratic Party, reiterated a claim he had made in December of 1971
that the Nixon Administration had made a deal with ITT in return for the consent decrees.
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unsettled, it must be interpreted and clarified. In our federal
system the task of interpretation has traditionally been that of
the judiciary which, at least theoretically, is independent of those
in political power. On the other hand, the members of the executive branch of the government, particularly the Justice Department, are extremely political and are subject to the whim of those
who appoint them to and remove them from office. Therefore, the
executive branch seems to be the wrong decisionmaker if separation of powers is to continue to exist.2 7 Since an increase in economic concentration will probably lead to an increase in political
power, perhaps Congress should consider the curtailment of the
Justice Department's power to enter into consent decrees and
thereby force such matters to be settled in the courts which are
the proper arbiters of legal questions.
F. MARION HUGHES
127. A special House subcommittee has announced plans to hold further hearings
concerning the ITT cases and the consent decrees. This announcement resulted from a
study made by the Securities and Exchange Commission in 1972 allegedly linking President Nixon, Vice-President Agnew, former Attorney General John Mitchell, and other
high administration officials with the antitrust settlement of 1971. N.Y. Times, March 29,
1973, at 1, Col. 4.
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